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Introduction
All development interventions endeavour to make a difference
and to demonstrate that they are doing so. They undertake
activities and produce outputs that are expected to lead
through a sequence of events to specific improvements in the
well-being of beneficiaries. However, as is well known, making
the causal link between the activities and outputs and
subsequent impacts can be challenging:
 The causal path between the activities/outputs and 
the impacts can be quite extended, involving a long
causal sequence of immediate and intermediate results and
often a long time-scale
 Events and conditions outside those of the intervention 
can influence the extent to which the impacts are brought
about
 There may be a number of causes, including other 
concurrent interventions, contributing to the realisation of
the impacts in addition to the influence of the
intervention. The intervention is not working alone.
The Natural Resource Management Research (NRMR) efforts of
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR) are a good example. NRMR has been defined as
"[research] interventions in the natural world of land, water,
oceans, atmosphere and biota that can influence (positively or
negatively) food security and rural poverty in the developing
world" (Keating, 2011: 3). The causal path between the
intervention on the natural world and the impacts sought is
often distant. Many factors affect food security and rural
poverty, and there are likely to be other government, donor and
NGO interventions at play trying to influence these impacts.
In such cases, what can be said about the causal relationship
between the NRMR and related intervention activities, and the
observed results? Indeed, we expect that the intervention, as a
cause, has some effect and want to be able to make some
credible causal claim about the intervention, such as:
 The intervention caused the impacts
 The intervention made a difference
 The intervention contributed to the impacts.
What type of causal claim makes sense? And how can we go
about making that claim?
Concepts of causality
Can we say the intervention 'caused' the impacts? For
example, that a particular intervention on farming methods
caused a reduction in rural poverty. Clearly we cannot. There
will be a number of 'causes' of any observed impacts and we
hope that the intervention is one of these and, perhaps, a
significant one. Saying the intervention caused the impacts is
much too simplistic and scarcely credible.
Causality involves relationships between events or conditions
and is often discussed in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions. Is then, the intervention a necessary cause of the
impacts? I would argue that, most of the time, the answer is
no. Necessity means that the impacts can only be realised if
there is the specific intervention. Yet most desired impacts,
such as better health or education, reduced poverty,
improved environmental conditions, greater democracy, etc.,
can potentially be realised through a variety of different types
of interventions, and not only the specific intervention of
interest. It would be presumptuous to say that your
intervention is the only way possible to bring about the
desired impacts.
Might we instead be able to say that the intervention is
sufficient? Again, clearly, the answer is no. We are assuming
that there are a number of – perhaps many – other factors
also at work. So, on its own, the intervention is not
sufficient. In the NRMR case, it is widely recognised that
many other events and conditions will have to be in place in
addition to the activities of the intervention for the desired
impacts to be achieved.
However, we do expect that the intervention, along with the
other influencing factors, is indeed sufficient; that collectively
this set of actions and conditions, including the intervention,
did bring about the impacts. And indeed, when we say X
causes Y in everyday discussions, sufficiency is probably what
we usually mean; that X did indeed produce or lead to Y.
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Making causal claims
John Mayne
An ongoing challenge in evaluation is the need to make credible causal claims linking observed results to the actions
of interventions. In the very common situation where the intervention is only one of a number of causal factors at
play, the problem is compounded – no one factor 'caused' the result. The intervention on its own is neither necessary
nor sufficient to bring about the result. The Brief argues the need for a different perspective on causality. One can
still speak of the intervention making a difference in the sense that the intervention was a necessary element of a
package of causal factors that together were sufficient to bring about the results. It was a contributory cause. The
Brief further argues that theories of change are models showing how an intervention operates as a contributory
cause. Using theories of change, approaches such as contribution analysis can be used to demonstrate that the
intervention made a difference – that it was a contributory cause – and to explain how and why.
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There is of course, a large and long standing literature on causality,
going back centuries, and these issues and concerns have been
repeatedly addressed. Causes that are neither necessary nor sufficient
are called contributory causes. Thus, for example, smoking heavily is a
contributory cause of lung cancer. It is not a necessary cause, since
there are other sources of lung cancer, and it is not a sufficient cause,
since not all such smokers suffer from lung cancer. In the philosophy
literature, a contributory cause is called an INUS cause – an Insufficient,
but Necessary, part of a condition that is, itself, Unnecessary, but
Sufficient for the occurrence of the effect (Mackie, 1974).
In a recent study undertaken for the Department for International
Development (DFID), we found that thinking about and
conceptualising development interventions as contributory causes
was especially helpful (Stern et al., 2012). In fact, many interventions
are designed to be part of a package of other causal events and
conditions, and even when not so designed, need to take these other
influencing conditions and factors into account. Cartwright and Hardie
(2012) call these supporting factors – other events and conditions that
need to happen in order for the intervention to work, i.e., to make a
difference. Identifying and understanding supporting factors is clearly
important in assessing NRMR type programmes since these factors
often entail other partners doing things that are needed for the
programme to work.
In these cases, the key causal question becomes the following: was the
causal package of the intervention plus its supporting factors sufficient
to produce the intended result? It is recognised that there could be
other ways in which the desired result could be brought about and,
hence, that the particular causal package in question is not necessary
to achieve the result. In addition, we would want to know if the
intervention was an essential part of the specific causal package.
Perhaps the desired result could be realised with just the supporting
factors and without the intervention. The causal package with these
two characteristics – sufficiency of the package and necessity of the
intervention as part of the package – is the intervention causal package.
If these conditions hold, then the intervention is a contributory cause
and has 'made a difference'. That is, the intervention was a necessary
element of the causal package which was sufficient to produce an
observed result. This is a useful and operational definition of 'making a
difference'.
As a contributory cause, an NRMR programme is one among several
'causes'. Yet our interest is on the programme as an 'intervention' – a
collection of activities deliberately undertaken to get change
happening where adequate change was not happening before. We
would like to know what role the intervention played in bringing
about the impacts. We may expect that, at a minimum, the
programme acts as a trigger to start the causal chain. And in the
complex contexts we are considering, the programme may also involve
other subsequent actions taken along the causal pathway to sustain
the causal pathway. Thus, we would like to assess whether
programmes were triggering contributory causes and/or sustaining
contributory causes. In such cases, a programme can be said to be a
principal contributory cause. In other cases, the programme might see
itself as playing a more modest supporting role, joining others in an
already ongoing process; enhancing a change process already
underway so that better, or more timely, results are achieved.
For NRMR, we would expect that the intervention is a principal
contributory cause in reducing rural poverty and increasing food security.
That is, that the research and related intervention activities, plus a
number of other supporting factors, were sufficient to realise the
expected impacts and that the research and related intervention activities
played an essential role in making the causal package sufficient.
Here, so far, the discussion of contributory causes has been in
deterministic terms, i.e., a cause is either sufficient or it is not.
However, the discussion needs to reflect the probabilistic nature of
causality for socio-economic phenomena. Mahoney (2008: 421)
argues that "a treatment is a cause when its presence raises the
probability of an outcome occurring in any given case …". Following
on from Mahoney, in terms of the intervention causal package, I
suggest the term likely necessary to describe the supporting factors
that are usually, or almost always have to be, present for the outcome
to occur. And I suggest likely sufficient to describe the sufficiency of
the intervention causal package, meaning that, in this case, the causal
package most likely produced the observed result. For an intervention
being evaluated, these are more realistic interpretations of the
necessary and sufficient conditions as discussed earlier.
With these perspectives on causality, the key causal questions related
to an intervention are:
1. Is it likely that the intervention has made a difference?
 Is it likely that the intervention was a contributory cause of the
result?
What role did the intervention play in the causal package?
2. How and why has the intervention made a difference?
 How did the causal factors combine to bring about the result?
 What context was relevant and which mechanisms were at work?
 Has the intervention resulted in any unintended effects?
Fish farming as an example of a causal package
Consider a specific example of an NRMR-type intervention. This
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR)-
World Vision intervention seeks to improve the diet, food security and
income of low income farmers in northern Thailand by encouraging and
helping them adopt freshwater fishing (Harris, 2010). It involves NRMR
issues of improving land and water management. Selected farmers
participated in the research, developing low cost fish food from local
materials. They were provided with initial funds for equipment and for
young fingerlings, and gave and provided advice on fish farming
methods to the researchers and their peers. In addition to improving
their own lives, others were expected to adopt fish farming by example.
The initiative's components were:
 Participatory research on low cost fish food
 Start-up funding
 Advice on improved fish farming methods
Other supporting factors mentioned in the report were:
 An adequate number of initial farmers convinced to try fish farming
 An adequate market for the fish superfluous to the families' 
requirements
 An adequate supply of affordable healthy fingerlings
 Support from the farmer's family for the additional work involved
 Improvement in the lives of adopters over time, which was visible 
to neighbours
 Availability of adequate cash to buy fish food and other supplies
The intervention causal package is this set of components of the
initiative and the other supporting factors. Clearly the intervention is
not sufficient on its own, and neither is it necessary; an alternative
approach to achieving the intended results would be, for example, to
provide set-up funds and training for the farmers' households to start
cottage weaving businesses, or to provide resources and training to
increase yields of existing food and cash crops.
The initiative made a difference if (1) the expected results were achieved
as a result of the initiative and its supporting factors and (2) the
initiative was an essential component of the causal package.
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If the expected results did not occur then one would want to try to
understand why. Did some of the supporting factors fail to occur? Were
there other factors that now appear to have been needed, but which did
not occur? Were the initiative activities poorly implemented, inadequate
or unsound? Was the causal model sound? And if  there were
unexpected results – either positive or negative – we would also try to
understand why they occurred.
Demonstrating contributory causes
How then to go about demonstrating that an intervention is a
contributory cause? One approach is to connect causal packages to
theories of change, and adopt a generative or mechanistic approach to
causality.
Theories of change incorporate causal packages
A well-developed theory of change is embedded in the context of the
intervention. The theory of change would be developed using the
perspectives of the key stakeholders and beneficiaries, and would be
informed by existing relevant research. The theory of change would include:
 A results (causal) chain showing the basic logic of the intervention
 The underlying assumptions behind the links in the results chain
 The risks attendant upon each link occurring
 Identification of unintended effects
 Identification of plausible, alternative, rival explanations.
Thus, theories of change are models of causal sufficiency – they set out a
model of how the intervention is expected to contribute to the desired
results. Hence, theories of change not only incorporate causal packages, but
also set out the expected relationships between the intervention and the
supporting factors (assumptions), as well as identify the risks (the
confounding factors). "A theory of change is a model of how the
intervention is expected to act as a contributing cause" (Mayne, 2012a: 7).
Approaches to demonstrating causality
The literature on causality discusses several alternative perspectives on how
to interpret and think about causality. There are at least four ways of
conceptualising and addressing causality:
 Regularity frameworks that depend on the frequency of association
between cause and effect – the basis for statistical approaches making
causal claims
 Counterfactual frameworks that depend on the difference between two 
otherwise identical cases – the basis for experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches to making causal claims
 Comparative frameworks that depend on combinations of causes that 
lead to an effect – the basis for 'configurational' approaches to making
causal claims, such as qualitative comparative analysis
 Generative frameworks that depend on identifying the causal links and 
mechanisms that explain effects – the basis for theory-based and realist
approaches to making causal claims (adapted from Stern et al., 2012:
16-17).
These different perspectives seek, primarily, to answer different types of
causal questions. Regularity and counterfactual approaches address
questions of the form: to what extent can a specific (net) impact be
attributed to the intervention? The CGIAR impact assessment is exclusively
focussed on making causal claims using the counterfactual approach.
Indeed, it defines impact assessment in those terms (Science Council
Secretariat, 2006). Singular thinking that causality can only be addressed
through counterfactual approaches is quite common in many quarters.
Comparative frameworks can address questions of the form, has the
intervention made a difference? Generative frameworks can also address this
causal question as well as questions about how and why the results were
brought about.
Of most interest for our discussion are the generative perspectives on
causality, which, indeed, are how, in every day life, causality if often seen
and interpreted. If one is trying to find the cause of an event, it is typical to
trace back what happened prior to the event to see what 'caused' it.
Theory of change approaches to showing a contributory cause
One application of this thinking is the use of impact pathways (Douthwaite
et al., 2008) – and related theory of change approaches – that are developed
to trace out how it is expected that the intervention will lead to the
anticipated impacts. Showing that each step along the pathway was caused
by the preceding one is using a generative view of causation to get at the
causal link between the intervention and the impact. Theory based
approaches to evaluation (Weiss, 1997; Stame, 2004; Rogers, 2007; White,
2009; Funnell and Rogers, 2011), such as contribution analysis (Mayne,
2008; Mayne, 2011), use these models of causation to make causal claims.
In particular, contribution analysis can be used to demonstrate if an
intervention is a contributory cause. In a recent Special Issue of the journal
Evaluation, several authors discuss the practice and concepts around
contribution analysis (Mayne, 2012b). Contribution analysis confirms
whether:
 The expected result occurred
 The causal package is sufficient:
 The supporting factors – the assumptions for each link in the 
theory of change – have occurred and together provide a 
reasonable explanation for the occurrence of the results
 Any other identified supporting factor that occurred has been 
included in the causal package, revising the theory of change as 
needed
 Important plausible, rival explanations have been accounted for.
 The intervention is a necessary part of the causal package:
 Without the activities and outputs of the intervention, the 
supporting factors alone are not sufficient to bring about the 
results.
It was noted earlier that the assumptions may only be likely necessary
conditions. Thus, in a specific case not all the assumptions in a theory of
change may have occurred, in which case an assessment is needed whether
the collection of actual supporting factors (assumptions) provides a
reasonable explanation for the occurrence of the observed result. This
analysis, plus the assessment of plausible, rival explanations, allows for the
causal inference to be made whether the intervention causal package (for
the link) was a contributory cause. If it was, and all the other links in the
causal chain are also confirmed, then the theory of change itself has been
confirmed.
Data and evidence for the contribution analysis would come from applying
logic, critical thinking and prior research, and asking relevant stakeholders
about each link, whether they believe there were other causal factors
beyond the package at work. If there were, one would need to ask about
evidence for their belief. Note that the links in a theory of change should
comprise relatively proximate cause and effect, thereby making judgement
and the use of logic and critical thinking easier.
Consider the fish farming intervention described earlier. How could we
explore whether the intervention was a contributory cause and, hence,
made a difference? We would first need to observe whether or not the key
expected results occurred, in particular in terms of initial adopters
maintaining their fish farms over time, and whether neighbours started fish
farms and maintained them. If this did happen, then we would like to
confirm that setting up the initial adopters was a contributory cause. If not,
then why did the theory of change not work as intended – at what point
did theory break down? In either case, one would want to explore if the
supporting factors came about and whether other factors, not in the causal
package, played a role and, in particular, if there were other rival
explanations for the observed results. The possibilities might include a
general rise in interest in fish farming, or a significant rise in the price for
commercial fish accounting for an increase in fish farming. Conversely, if the
initiative did not work, which supporting factors were not being realised?
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Finally, in this case, the intervention would appear to have played a
triggering role. The early adopters did so as a direct result of the
intervention activities, starting the causal chain.
Concluding comments
This Brief suggests a new way of thinking about interventions and their
causal links to the results realised. Most development interventions of
any size are neither necessary nor sufficient causes of the intended
results, but, rather, should be thought of as contributory causes. That
is, we expect that the intervention, along with a set of necessary
supporting factors, was sufficient to bring about the intended outcomes
and impacts, and that the intervention was a necessary component of
this causal package.
From this perspective, the kinds of possible causal claims that make
sense answer the questions:
 Has the intervention likely made a difference?
 How and why has the intervention made a difference?
These issues can be addressed using a generative perspective on
causality and employing theory-based approaches in the evaluation.
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